Governing Generative AI, end to end.
Everything a practitioner needs to run governance, risk, and compliance for GenAI — taught through a real organization's control library, risk register, and compliance posture.
Module 00 — Orientation
The 360° View of GRC for GenAI
GRC — Governance, Risk, and Compliance — is the discipline of steering an organization toward its objectives (governance), understanding what could go wrong (risk), and proving you meet your obligations (compliance). It has existed for decades in finance, security, and privacy. Generative AI does not replace this discipline; it stress-tests it.
A “360° view” means refusing to look at AI governance through a single lens. The same AI system is simultaneously a governance question (who is accountable?), a risk question (what is the likelihood and impact of harm?), a compliance question (which laws bind us?), a control question (what mechanisms reduce the risk?), a lifecycle question (does this hold from design through decommissioning?), and an assurance question (can we prove any of it to an auditor?). This course walks all six faces of that cube.
Every module is anchored to one organization we'll call Aurelia Group — a fictional EU-facing financial-services firm with a complete, realistic set of GRC records (10 regulatory frameworks, 12 policies, 35 controls, 22 risks, 18 audit findings, and more). Aurelia is a perfect teaching subject because it is mature everywhere except AI: its data-protection, security, and financial-reporting controls are largely implemented and effective, while its AI control program is almost entirely on paper.
Here is Aurelia's posture in numbers — pulled directly from the database you'll query in Module 14:
The story the data tells: Aurelia treated AI as a technology project, not a governed asset. The rest of this course is the remediation plan — generalized into a discipline you can apply anywhere.
The six faces of the cube
GenAI does not need a separate GRC function. It needs your existing GRC function extended with AI-native risks, AI-specific controls, and three new regulatory frameworks — governed across the full model lifecycle rather than signed off once at launch.
Governance — the “G”
Who is accountable, and by what authority?
- Distinguish governance from management, and policy from control.
- Read Aurelia's policy hierarchy and locate the single AI Governance Policy.
- Design an AI accountability model: board, owners, and the “three lines.”
Governance is the setting of intent
Governance answers three questions: What are we trying to achieve? Who decides? Who is answerable when it goes wrong? In GRC, governance is expressed primarily through policies — board-sanctioned statements of intent — which are then operationalized by controls (Module 08) and measured by risk (Module 02).
The distinction that trips people up: governance is not management. Management runs the AI system; governance constrains how management is allowed to run it, and holds them accountable. An AI Ethics Board that also builds the models has no independence and provides no governance.
Aurelia's policy hierarchy
Aurelia maintains 12 policies. Eleven are conventional and mostly Active. Exactly one governs AI — and its status is the first red flag in the whole dossier:
| Policy | Category | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data Protection & Privacy | Data Privacy | Chief Privacy Officer | Active |
| Information Security | Security | CISO | Active |
| Access Control | Security | CISO | Active |
| Incident Response | Security | CISO | Active |
| Third-Party Risk Management | Vendor | VP Procurement | Active |
| Financial Reporting Controls | Finance | CFO | Active |
| Cloud Security | Security | CISO | Draft |
| AI Governance Policy | Technology | CTO | Under Review |
Aurelia's AI Governance Policy is owned by the CTO and sits Under Review — never ratified. Yet it is the parent of all 12 AI controls in the library. An un-ratified policy cannot compel a control. This single governance gap cascades into every compliance failure we'll see later: with no active policy, there is no mandate to fund the AI Ethics Board, no authority to block a non-conforming launch, and no owner the auditor can hold answerable.
The AI accountability model
A defensible model assigns three kinds of role. Aurelia's data shows all three already exist as control owners — AI Ethics Board, ML Engineering, Data Governance Team — they are simply not yet empowered by an active policy.
The “three lines” model, applied to AI
- First line — the builders (ML Engineering) own and operate controls at the point of risk.
- Second line — risk & compliance (AI Ethics Board, Privacy) set policy, challenge, and monitor.
- Third line — independent internal audit provides assurance the other two lines actually work (Module 10).
Ratify the policy first. Every downstream control, risk treatment, and compliance claim inherits its authority from an active governance mandate. Aurelia's entire AI failure traces back to a policy stuck “Under Review.”
Risk — the “R”
What could go wrong, how badly, and how likely?
- Score risk with a 5×5 likelihood–impact matrix and read a risk register.
- Name the AI-native risk categories traditional registers miss.
- Choose a treatment strategy: mitigate, accept, transfer, or avoid.
The anatomy of a risk
A risk is a potential future event with an uncertain outcome. We make it tractable by scoring two dimensions on a 1–5 scale and multiplying them:
Risk Score = Likelihood (1–5) × Impact (1–5)
The product (1–25) buckets into levels. Aurelia uses the conventional bands: Low 1–4 Medium 5–9 High 10–16 Critical 17–25. Scoring forces disagreement into the open: two people who both call a risk “bad” may be a full band apart on impact.
Eight of Aurelia's ten AI risks land in the High or Critical zone. The lone Critical — R16 · score 20 — is deploying a high-risk AI system without a conformity assessment.
AI-native risk categories
A traditional register carries buckets like Cybersecurity, Financial, Operations, Third-Party. Aurelia's register adds three the pre-AI world didn't need — and they now dominate the top of the heatmap:
Notice these are outcome categories. Module 11 goes one level deeper into the mechanisms — hallucination, prompt injection, drift — that generate them.
Treatment: the four T's
- Treat / Mitigate — reduce likelihood or impact with a control. Aurelia mitigates all 28 tracked risk items this way; every AI mitigation is still Planned or In Progress.
- Tolerate / Accept — consciously bear it (see R8, “Regulatory Change,” status Accepted). Acceptance is a governance decision and must be signed by the risk owner.
- Transfer — shift it via insurance or contract. Note: you cannot contractually transfer regulatory liability for an AI system away from yourself.
- Terminate / Avoid — don't do the thing. The only valid response to an Unacceptable-risk AI system under the AI Act (Module 04).
Scoring is a forcing function, not a formula. The value of R16 isn't that it equals 20 — it's that saying “likelihood 4, impact 5” out loud makes the board confront a launch decision they were treating as routine engineering.
Compliance — the “C”
Which obligations bind us, and can we prove it?
- Understand the compliance mapping — the join between a control and a legal requirement.
- Read Aurelia's compliance posture and see why AI frameworks score red.
- Grasp why evidence location is the difference between compliant and “trust me.”
Compliance is a join table
Compliance, mechanically, is a many-to-many relationship: one control can satisfy several legal requirements, and one requirement usually needs several controls. Aurelia stores 48 compliance mappings, each recording four things: the control, the framework, the specific requirement reference (e.g. Art. 14), and the evidence location — the pointer to the artifact that proves it.
That evidence pointer is the whole game. A control that is “Implemented” but whose mapping has evidence_location = null is, to an auditor, not compliant — it is an unsupported assertion.
Zero AI-framework requirements are fully compliant across all three frameworks — and every Non-compliant AI mapping has a null evidence location. The contrast with the six traditional frameworks (nearly all green) is the entire lesson.
The three-state compliance model
SharePoint/GRC/GDPR/Art32.Look at mapping IDs 27–48 in the database: every AI Act, AICM, and AIEU requirement marked Non-Compliant carries evidence_location = null. Aurelia cannot prove compliance because there is nothing to point to. Compliance is not what you do — it's what you can show. This is why Module 10 (assurance) and Module 03 are two sides of one coin.
Compliance = requirement × control × evidence. Drop any factor and the product is zero. Aurelia has requirements and (planned) controls but no evidence — so its AI compliance is, correctly, scored at zero.
The EU AI Act
The world's first horizontal AI law
- Classify any AI system into the Act's four risk tiers.
- Enumerate the provider obligations for high-risk systems, by article.
- Place your organization on the enforcement timeline and penalty scale.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 — the AI Act — entered into force on 1 August 2024 and applies extraterritorially: it binds any provider or deployer whose AI output is used in the EU, regardless of where they sit. It is risk-based: obligations scale with the potential for harm, sorted into four tiers.
The four risk tiers
| Tier | What it covers | Obligation | Anchor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unacceptable | Social scoring, manipulative or exploitative AI, untargeted facial scraping, most real-time remote biometric ID in public | Banned outright | Art. 5 |
| High | Annex III use cases: creditworthiness, recruitment, biometric ID, critical infrastructure, education, essential services, law enforcement, medical devices | Full conformity regime (below) | Art. 6 · Annex III |
| Limited | Chatbots, emotion recognition, deepfakes / synthetic media | Transparency only — disclose the AI/artificial nature | Art. 50 |
| Minimal | Spam filters, AI in games, inventory optimization, predictive maintenance | No mandatory obligations (voluntary codes) | — |
A separate track governs General-Purpose AI (GPAI) models — the foundation models behind most GenAI. Providers face transparency and copyright-summary duties (Art. 53); models posing systemic risk face additional evaluation and incident-reporting duties (Art. 55).
Aurelia's credit-scoring and AI hiring tools fall squarely under Annex III — creditworthiness and employment — making them High-risk. Its customer-service chatbot is Limited-risk (transparency only). Its predictive-maintenance model is Minimal. One organization, three tiers — which is exactly why classification is the first lifecycle gate (Module 09).
High-risk provider obligations — the checklist
This is the heart of the Act, and every row maps to a control in Aurelia's library. Cross-reference the “Aurelia status” column against Module 08 to see the remediation gap.
| Obligation | Article | What it demands | Aurelia status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk management system | Art. 9 | A continuous, lifecycle risk process for the system | Non-compliant |
| Data & data governance | Art. 10 | Training data relevant, representative, examined for bias | Non-compliant |
| Technical documentation | Art. 11 · Annex IV | Full design, development & monitoring dossier | Partial |
| Record-keeping / logging | Art. 12 | Automatic event logging over the system's lifetime | Partial |
| Transparency to deployers | Art. 13 | Clear instructions & disclosure of capabilities/limits | Partial |
| Human oversight | Art. 14 | Ability to interpret, override, interrupt, or stop the system | Partial |
| Accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity | Art. 15 | Perform reliably; resist error, manipulation, attack | Partial |
| Conformity assessment | Art. 43 | Verify all of the above before market placement | Non-compliant |
| Registration in EU database | Art. 49 · 71 | List the high-risk system publicly before deployment | Non-compliant |
| Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment | Art. 27 | Deployer assesses rights impact before use | Non-compliant |
| Post-market monitoring | Art. 72 | Actively monitor performance in the field | Non-compliant |
| Serious-incident reporting | Art. 73 | Report serious incidents to authorities within deadlines | Non-compliant |
Note: Aurelia's database labels serious-incident reporting as Art. 62 and registration as Art. 71 — earlier draft numbering. The final Regulation renumbered these to Art. 73 and Art. 49/71. Watching for stale article references is itself a compliance skill.
Timeline & penalties
Regulation enters into force.
Art. 5 bans + AI-literacy duties apply.
General-purpose model obligations apply.
Annex III obligations apply — the deadline Aurelia is racing.
High-risk safety-component systems (Annex I).
Penalties (Art. 99) scale with the breach: up to €35M or 7% of global turnover for prohibited-practice violations; up to €15M or 3% for breaching most obligations (the tier Aurelia's high-risk gaps fall into); up to €7.5M or 1% for supplying incorrect information to authorities.
With high-risk obligations applying August 2026, Aurelia's twelve non-compliant obligations are not a future concern — they are a live exposure of up to 3% of global turnover on systems it is operating right now.
AICM — AI Compliance Management
Compliance as a lifecycle, not an event
- See how AICM operationalizes the AI Act's demands into a continuous management system.
- Map AICM's six requirement domains to Aurelia's controls.
Where the AI Act says what you must achieve, AICM (AI Compliance Management) is the framework for how you keep achieving it over time. Think of it as the ISO-style management-system layer for AI: it turns point-in-time obligations (pass a conformity assessment once) into standing processes (re-assess on every material change, monitor continuously, track the whole lifecycle).
Aurelia maps six AICM requirement domains — and every one is currently Non-compliant or Partial:
AICM is what stops compliance from decaying. A model that passed conformity assessment at launch and then silently drifted for six months is AI Act compliant on paper and AICM non-compliant in reality — and it's the AICM view that catches the actual harm.
AIEU — Trustworthy AI in the EU
The ethics layer: from legal to legitimate
- Distinguish the ethical principles of trustworthy AI from the legal minimum.
- Connect AIEU principles to concrete controls and impact assessments.
The AI Act sets the legal floor. AIEU (AI Ethics in the EU), rooted in the EU's Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, raises the bar to what is legitimate — the practices that keep public trust even where the law is silent. Its requirements overlap the Act but are framed as principles rather than checkboxes.
| AIEU principle | What it asks | Aurelia mapping |
|---|---|---|
| Transparency & Explainability TR-01 | Affected people can get a meaningful explanation of a decision | Partial |
| Fairness & Non-Discrimination FA-01 | No systematic disadvantage to protected groups | Non-compliant |
| Human Oversight & Autonomy HO-01 | Humans retain meaningful control | Partial |
| Fundamental Rights Protection FR-01 | Rights impact assessed before deployment | Non-compliant |
| Accountability & Governance AC-01 | Clear ownership and answerability | Non-compliant |
| Robustness & Safety RO-01 | Reliable, secure, resilient behavior | Partial |
Aurelia's R22 — Fundamental Rights Violation (score 15) exists precisely because the Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment control (FRIA, Art. 27 / AIEU-FR-01) was never built. The ethics gap and the legal gap are the same gap, seen from two angles — which is the entire point of a 360 view.
How the Laws Interlock
AI never arrives alone
- See how GDPR, the AI Act, and sectoral law stack on a single AI system.
- Avoid the trap of governing AI in a silo.
A GenAI system rarely triggers one law. Aurelia's credit-scoring model simultaneously engages: the AI Act (it's high-risk Annex III), GDPR (it processes personal data and makes automated decisions — Art. 22 gives the applicant a right to human review), AIEU (fairness, explainability), and sector rules on consumer credit. These are not alternatives; they are layers, and they can conflict.
GDPR's Art. 22 “right to human review” and the AI Act's Art. 14 “human oversight” push the same control. Build it once, satisfy both. Aurelia's AI Human Oversight Mechanism control (ID 28) maps to both AI Act Art. 14 and AIEU-HO-01.
GDPR's data-minimization can fight the AI Act's demand for representative training data (Art. 10) — you may need more demographic data to prove non-discrimination. Resolving this needs a documented, lawful basis, not a shrug.
Govern AI at the system level, not the law level. Aurelia's mistake was a stand-alone “AI Governance Policy” disconnected from its mature privacy program — the two must be a single control fabric, or you'll double-build and still miss the seams.
Controls
The mechanisms that make policy real
- Classify controls by function (preventive / detective / corrective) and measure effectiveness.
- Read the maturity gap between Aurelia's traditional and AI controls.
- Build the AI control set the AI Act actually requires.
Three control functions
A mature program balances all three. A control is only worth its evidence, so each also carries an effectiveness rating — Effective, Partially Effective, or Not Assessed — set by testing, not by opinion.
The maturity gap, in one chart
Compare: of Aurelia's 23 non-AI controls, the overwhelming majority are Implemented / Effective. The organization knows how to build controls — it simply hasn't turned that muscle on AI yet.
The AI control set — what “good” looks like
These twelve controls (all children of the AI Governance Policy) are the operational answer to Module 04's obligation checklist. This is the target-state library Aurelia must build:
| Control | Type | Owner | Status | Serves |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI Model Risk Assessment | Preventive | AI Ethics Board | Planned | Art. 9 |
| AI Bias Testing | Detective | ML Engineering | Planned | Art. 10(2)(f) |
| AI System Registration | Preventive | AI Ethics Board | Not impl. | Art. 71 |
| AI Transparency & Explainability | Preventive | ML Engineering | Partial | Art. 13 |
| AI Human Oversight Mechanism | Preventive | AI Ethics Board | Partial | Art. 14 |
| AI Data Governance | Preventive | Data Governance | Planned | Art. 10 |
| AI Conformity Assessment | Preventive | AI Ethics Board | Not impl. | Art. 43 |
| AI Incident Reporting | Corrective | SOC Team | Not impl. | Art. 73 |
| AI Technical Documentation | Preventive | ML Engineering | Partial | Annex IV |
| AI Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment | Preventive | AI Ethics Board | Not impl. | Art. 27 |
| AI Post-Market Monitoring | Detective | ML Engineering | Planned | AICM-PM |
| AI Lifecycle Compliance Tracking | Detective | AI Ethics Board | Not impl. | AICM-LC |
Notice the balance: the AI control set is heavy on preventive gates (assessment, oversight, registration) because with high-risk AI, the cheapest place to stop harm is before deployment. Detective controls (monitoring, bias testing) then catch drift the gates can't foresee.
The AI-GRC Lifecycle
Governance that travels with the model
- Walk an AI system through seven governance gates from intake to retirement.
- See which control fires at each gate and what evidence it produces.
The single biggest failure mode in AI governance is treating it as a launch checkpoint. Real governance is a relay — control ownership passes from gate to gate, each producing evidence the next depends on. This is the operating spine that ties every prior module together.
Register the initiative. Capture purpose, data, users, deployment geography.
Assign AI Act risk tier + internal risk score. Art. 6 / AICM-RM.
Data governance, oversight, transparency built in. Art. 10·13·14.
Independent pre-deployment verification + FRIA. Art. 43·27.
List in EU database; CE-mark; go live. Art. 49·71.
Post-market drift, performance, incident watch. Art. 72·73.
Decommission with evidence retention; close the lifecycle record.
Aurelia has AI systems in production that never passed Gate 4 — audit finding #16: “No conformity assessment completed for any AI system.” They jumped from Gate 3 straight to live operation, skipping conformity, registration, and monitoring. The lifecycle view makes the illegal shortcut obvious in a way the control list alone does not.
Each gate is a stop, not a suggestion. The governance body's power is the authority to refuse passage to the next gate — which only exists if the policy (Module 01) is ratified. Everything connects.
Audit & Assurance
Independent proof it actually works
- Understand the audit finding as the atomic unit of assurance.
- Track severity, status, ownership, and remediation deadlines.
- Read Aurelia's AI findings as a prioritized worklist.
Assurance is the third line's answer to a simple question: “You say the control works — prove it.” The output is a set of audit findings, each a discrete gap with a severity, an owner, and a remediation deadline. Findings convert vague worry into a tracked, dated backlog.
Aurelia carries 18 findings; the eight AI-related ones are the most severe and every one is still Open:
| Finding | Severity | Owner | Due |
|---|---|---|---|
| No conformity assessment completed for any AI system despite AI Act enforcement | Critical | AI Ethics Board | 2025-09-01 |
| No AI system registration process exists for EU AI Act compliance | Critical | AI Ethics Board | 2025-06-01 |
| Human override capability not available for AI-driven credit scoring | Critical | AI Ethics Board | 2025-05-01 |
| No AI model risk-assessment framework despite 3 models in production | High | AI Ethics Board | 2025-06-01 |
| Chatbot provides no explanation for escalation decisions | High | ML Engineering | 2025-06-01 |
| Fraud-detection training data not assessed for bias / representativeness | High | Data Governance | 2025-07-01 |
| No fundamental-rights impact assessment for AI hiring tool | High | AI Ethics Board | 2025-07-01 |
| No lifecycle compliance tracking for 5 AI systems in production | High | AI Ethics Board | 2025-09-01 |
Read as a worklist, the pattern is unmistakable: the Critical findings all block deployment legality (conformity, registration, human override), while the High findings concern fairness and transparency. A risk-based remediation plan clears the Criticals first — they carry both the legal exposure and the earliest deadlines.
A finding with no owner and no date is a complaint; a finding with both is a commitment. Assurance value comes from the tracking, not the discovery. Note every Aurelia AI finding is owned and dated — the program's paperwork is sound; its execution is late.
GenAI-Specific Risks
The failure modes traditional GRC never had to name
- Name the mechanisms that generate AI harm — the layer beneath the risk register.
- Match each to a control and a regulatory hook.
Modules 02–10 governed AI risk as outcomes (bias, non-compliance). This module goes underneath, to the mechanisms unique to generative and agentic systems. These are what your control set must actually defend against — and most are absent from a pre-AI register.
Here's the twist worth sitting with: the very tools teams build to help with governance — an assistant that autonomously researches regulations and queries internal systems — are themselves agentic GenAI systems carrying the exact autonomy risks above. The safe versions keep their data access read-only, treat their outputs as advisory, and keep a human in the loop. Governing your own AI tools is where the discipline stops being theory.
Every AI-native mechanism here already has a home in the AI Act — the law was drafted around these failure modes. If you can name the mechanism, you can find the article, and from the article, the control.
Cross-Cutting GenAI Risk Domains
The risks the regulations alone won't catch — and how to mitigate them
- Work through the six risk domains that apply to every generative-AI system, whatever its AI-Act tier.
- For each, learn the specific harm, how it shows up in GenAI, and the concrete controls that reduce it.
- See why a “are we AI-Act compliant?” checklist is necessary but never sufficient.
Part II covered the laws. But several of the most important GenAI risks are not really about a specific statute — they are baked into how generative AI works, and they cut across every system regardless of its risk tier. A program that only asks “does this pass the AI Act?” will sail straight past them. This module walks the six domains a practitioner must actively manage, and — crucially — pairs each with mitigations you can actually build, not just risks to worry about.
The frameworks in Part II are the floor. These six domains are where the real, day-to-day harm of GenAI lives: leaked personal data, discriminatory outputs, confident falsehoods, copied content, borrowed models you can't see inside, and misuse you didn't intend. Treat each as a standing control family — designed, tested, and monitored over time — not a one-off box to tick at launch.
Domain 1Mitigating data-privacy concerns & protecting PII
The risk that personal data flows into — or leaks out of — a GenAI system.
Domain 2Alleviating biases
The risk that outputs systematically disadvantage some groups of people.
Generative models learn from vast amounts of human text and imagery, which carry society's historical prejudices. Left unchecked, the model reproduces — and can amplify — those patterns: stereotyped language, worse performance for some dialects or demographics, or subtly harsher treatment of certain groups in a decision-support setting.
Domain 3Managing open-source & model-supply-chain risks
The risk you inherit from the models and components you didn't build.
Almost no one trains a foundation model from scratch. You download an open-source model, or call a vendor's hosted one — and with it you inherit everything you can't see inside: how it was trained, on whose data, and whether it's safe.
Domain 4Contending with hallucinations
The risk of confident, fluent, and completely false output.
Domain 5Observing copyright & IP laws
The risk that AI ingests, reproduces, or leaks protected work — including your own.
Copyright touches GenAI from both directions: the model may have been trained on protected work, and it may generate output that reproduces someone's protected content. And there's a third, often-missed angle: your employees pasting your own trade secrets into a public model.
Domain 6Responsible use & societal impact
The risk that a system is legal but still harmful — to individuals, or to society.
The final domain is the widest: beyond any single law, does this system do right by the people it touches and the society it operates in? This is where governance becomes about legitimacy, not just compliance.
| Domain | Core risk | The three mitigations to reach for first |
|---|---|---|
| Data privacy & PII | Personal data leaks into or out of the model | Minimize / pseudonymize · DPA with no-training clause · DPIA |
| Bias | Outputs disadvantage some groups | Bias-test across demographics · human oversight · drift monitoring |
| Open-source / supply chain | You inherit unseen risks from borrowed models | Model provenance/cards · licence & vendor review · AI bill-of-materials |
| Hallucination | Confident falsehoods acted upon | Grounding + citations · abstain / escalate · human review of consequential output |
| Copyright & IP | Ingesting / reproducing / leaking protected work | Licensed & indemnified models · output plagiarism checks · prompt-input policy |
| Responsible use | Legal but harmful; misuse & societal impact | Acceptable-use policy · disclosure & provenance · misuse monitoring |
These six domains apply to every GenAI system — the Limited-risk RAG assistant and the High-risk agent alike. They are not an alternative to the regulatory work in Part II; they are the layer underneath it, where the actual harm happens. A mature program runs each as a standing control family — with an owner, tests, and monitoring — so “responsible AI” becomes something you can evidence, not just something you claim.
Two Case Studies, Start to Finish
Governing two real AI systems, step by step
- Follow two complete assessments — a RAG assistant and an autonomous agentic system — from the first description to a costed action plan.
- See how the same method produces a Limited-risk verdict for one and a High-risk one for the other, and understand exactly why.
- Learn the full path a governance assessor walks every time: understand → question → approach → frameworks → policies → controls → risks → assessment → compliance → gaps → action plan.
Everything so far has been the vocabulary and the rules. This module puts them to work. We take two AI systems a real company might actually try to build, and we assess each one the way a governance advisor would — slowly, out loud, explaining every judgment. If you have never done a risk-and-compliance assessment before, this is the module where it clicks: you will see that it is not magic or law-school knowledge, it is a disciplined sequence of sensible questions.
Read them as a curious beginner, not a lawyer. We name specific regulations and articles so you know where to look, but the goal is to teach you the thinking — how to move from “we want to build this” to “here is exactly what we must do first.” Treat every legal reference as a solid starting point to confirm with a specialist, not as legal advice. The value is the method, and the method transfers to any AI system you will ever be handed.
Case Study ① — A “RAG” assistant for insurance customer support
Part 1Understanding the use-case in full
A mid-sized insurance company based in the European Union wants to make its customer-support team faster and more consistent. Every day, support agents answer hundreds of questions — “Does my policy cover water damage?”, “Why was my claim only partly paid?”, “How do I add my new car?” Answering well means digging through dense policy documents and the customer's own file. It is slow, and different agents give different answers. The company wants an AI assistant to help.
Concretely, here is what the proposed system does, in order:
- A support agent is on a case. The customer's question comes in by phone or email.
- The assistant retrieves. It searches three sources: the company's product documentation, the exact policy wordings, and that specific customer's own policy record and claims history.
- The assistant drafts. Using only what it retrieved, it writes a suggested reply for the agent.
- A human reviews and edits. The support agent reads the draft, corrects it, and only then sends it. The AI never speaks to the customer directly.
Two facts shape the entire assessment. First, the retrieval step pulls in the customer's personal and financial data (their name, policy number, claims history). Second, the assistant is built on a third-party hosted LLM (large language model) API — meaning the text it works with, including that customer data, is sent out over the internet to an outside vendor's servers to be processed. The company wants this live in four months, serving EU customers only.
Part 2The questions to think through — and why each one matters
Before reaching for any regulation, a good assessor interrogates the design. Each question below narrows down what the system really is; the answer changes what rules apply and how much work is required. This questioning is the assessment starting — everything downstream flows from it.
- Does the system make a decision about a person, or only suggest text to a human who decides?Only suggests. A human agent reads, edits, and sends every reply; the AI has no authority of its own.
Why it matters: This is the single most important question in the whole assessment. The law treats “an AI that decides your fate” very differently from “an AI that helps a person do their job faster.” The answer here is what keeps this system out of the strict, expensive “high-risk” category. - Could a draft ever contain a number or recommendation that affects the customer's entitlement — a claim amount, a coverage decision, a price?No. It only explains and drafts; it never computes what someone is owed.
Why it matters: This is the trap-door. Insurance pricing and claims decisions are explicitly high-risk under EU law. If a future version started suggesting payout figures, the system would silently fall through into the high-risk category and need a completely heavier compliance regime. Naming this now prevents an accidental, illegal upgrade later. - Whose personal data touches the system, and does it leave the company's control?Customers' personal and financial data enters the retrieval context, and yes — it is sent to an external LLM vendor to be processed.
Why it matters: The moment personal data leaves your walls, data-protection law (GDPR) becomes the dominant concern — often bigger than the AI-specific rules. This one answer relocates the centre of gravity of the whole assessment from “AI” to “privacy.” - What is our lawful basis to use each customer's data this way, and do we actually have it for everyone?We rely on consent / legitimate interest — but roughly 12% of customer accounts are missing valid consent records.
Why it matters: Under GDPR you may only process personal data if you have a lawful reason. Data for those 12% of customers cannot legally be fed into the assistant until that is fixed. A gap you can name is a gap you can close; a gap you ignore becomes a fine. - Is the “human in the loop” genuine, or will it become a rubber stamp?It must be actively enforced. Agents under time pressure tend to skim and accept.
Why it matters: The system's safety depends entirely on the human actually reviewing. This tendency to trust the machine is called automation bias, and it quietly turns a “safe” design into an unsafe one. If we can't prove the human really reviews, the whole “it only suggests” argument collapses. - What happens if the assistant is confidently wrong?A hallucinated policy detail could be sent to a customer as fact, leading to a wrong decision, a complaint, or a regulatory problem under insurance conduct rules.
Why it matters: RAG reduces made-up answers but does not remove them. Beginners often assume “it looked it up, so it must be right.” Planning for the wrong-but-confident case is what separates a toy from a governed system. - Can we trust the vendor with our data — will they train their models on it, and where do they store it?Unknown until we have a contract. By default, some providers may retain or learn from submitted data.
Why it matters: You inherit your vendor's risks. If the provider trains on your data or suffers a breach, your customers are exposed and you are accountable. This is why a specific data contract (below) is non-negotiable. - Who owns this system and is answerable for its risks?To be assigned — the organization has an AI oversight function on paper but it is not yet empowered.
Why it matters: Every risk needs a named owner or nothing gets fixed. “The company” is not an owner; a person is. Without clear ownership, a four-month project has no one to stop it launching unsafe.
Part 3How to approach it — the assessor's method
An assessment is not a form; it is a mindset followed by a sequence. The mindset for a beginner to absorb: govern the system by what it can actually do, not by what it is called. “RAG” and “AI” are labels; the rules attach to behaviour — does it decide, does it act, whose data does it touch. With that in mind, the method is eight steps, and the rest of this case study simply walks them:
Notice the shape: you move from understanding to obligations to a plan. A beginner who follows these eight steps in order will produce a defensible assessment of almost any AI system.
Part 4Which frameworks apply — and why this one is “Limited risk”
The EU AI Act sorts every AI system into four tiers by how much harm it could do: unacceptable (banned), high (heavy rules), limited (light rules), and minimal (none). To classify, you walk a short decision path. Is it a banned practice? No. Is it one of the “high-risk” uses the law lists (called Annex III) — things like credit scoring, hiring, or insurance pricing and claims decisions? This is the key test.
Here is the full set of frameworks that actually apply, explained plainly:
Part 5What policies to create — the rules the company sets for itself
A policy is an internal rule the organization writes for itself, usually to satisfy a law or prevent a risk. It states what must be true; the controls in Part 6 make it true. For this system, most policies already exist for the traditional business and simply need extending to AI — except the foundational one, which was never finalized.
Part 6How those policies become controls — the mechanisms that enforce them
A policy on its own is a promise. A control is the concrete mechanism that keeps the promise — the thing you can point at, switch on, and test. Each policy above turns into one or more controls. Read this as “the rule, and the machine that enforces it”:
| Policy (the rule) | Controls that enforce it (the mechanism) — in plain terms |
|---|---|
| Vendor / AI Policy | Sign the data contract (the DPA) before any live data flows; vet the vendor's security before onboarding; keep monitoring the vendor for changes or breaches over time. |
| Data Minimization Standard | A pseudonymization step that replaces names and policy numbers with meaningless codes before sending text to the API (the vendor never sees who it is); a consent filter — an automatic checkpoint that refuses to include any customer who hasn't given valid consent. |
| Human-Oversight Policy | A review screen that shows the source documents next to the AI's draft, requires the agent to actually edit, records how long they spent and what they changed, and blocks a one-click “approve unchanged.” Plus a complete log of every question, retrieved passage, draft, edit, and final message. |
| AI Literacy Policy | A short mandatory training course on hallucination, over-trust, and privacy duties, with completion tracked so you can prove everyone took it. |
| AI Governance Policy | The written risk study (DPIA); a documented description of the system; accuracy testing before launch (run hundreds of real questions and measure how often it's wrong); ongoing monitoring after launch. |
Part 7What the risks are
A risk is a bad thing that could happen. Here are the ten this system carries, in plain language — notice they cluster around data and accuracy, not the AI Act:
| What could go wrong | Score | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Customer personal data is exposed through the outside LLM vendor (no contract, no monitoring, some customers not even consented) | 25 | Critical |
| We're breaking the law by not training staff on the AI (an obligation already in force) | 20 | Critical |
| We process customer data without first doing the required written risk study (DPIA) | 20 | Critical |
| We have no working AI governance at all — no ownership, no checks | 20 | Critical |
| The assistant confidently invents a policy detail and a customer is told something false | 16 | High |
| Data leaks through the vendor over time because no one is watching them | 15 | High |
| Agents rubber-stamp the AI's drafts instead of really checking (automation bias) | 12 | High |
| The consented-vs-not gap (12%) is never filtered, so unlawful data keeps flowing | 12 | High |
| The assistant's drafts are subtly biased for some groups (never tested) | 12 | High |
| No records are kept, so we can't investigate anything later | 12 | High |
Part 8How to do the risk assessment — turning worry into a number
To compare risks fairly you score them. The standard way: rate Likelihood (how probable, 1–5) and Impact (how bad if it happens, 1–5) and multiply. The result (1–25) sorts into Low, Medium, High, Critical. Scoring isn't about mathematical precision — it's a forcing function that makes a team say out loud how worried they really are, so the scary-but-boring risks get funded alongside the flashy ones. Two worked examples:
The training-law risk, scored 20. Likelihood = 5 (there is no training program and the duty is already in force, so we are non-compliant today), Impact = 4 (fines, and — more practically — untrained agents can't provide the human oversight the whole design relies on). This is a “boring” compliance task that scoring pushes to the top, where it belongs.
Part 9Compliance — proving it, not just doing it
Here is the hardest truth in the whole discipline: compliance is not what you do — it's what you can prove. For every legal requirement you need three things lined up: the requirement, a control that satisfies it, and evidence — the document you could hand an inspector. A perfect safeguard with no evidence counts as non-compliant. Think of evidence as the receipt.
| The requirement | The control that meets it | The evidence (the receipt) |
|---|---|---|
| Have a data contract with the vendor (GDPR Art. 28) | Execute the DPA | The signed DPA, filed in the vendor register |
| Study the risk before processing (GDPR Art. 35) | Complete the DPIA | The DPIA document, signed off by the data-protection lead |
| Send only necessary data (GDPR Art. 5) | Pseudonymization step | The design doc + a test showing identifiers are stripped |
| Train the staff (AI Act Art. 4) | The training course | Completion records for every agent |
| Keep records (AI Act Art. 12) | The logging system | The retained logs of questions, drafts and edits |
Part 10Review — finding the gaps
A gap is simply a required control that is missing or ineffective. You find gaps by laying the “what we need” list next to the “what we have” list and circling the differences. Here, sorting them by urgency, three tiers appear:
Part 11The action plan — closing the gaps in the right order
Finally, turn the gaps into a sequenced plan. The rule of sequencing: do the launch-blocking items first — finishing a “nice to have” before a “must have” is wasted effort. We sort into three buckets:
Case Study ② — An autonomous “agentic” system for payment disputes
Part 1Understanding the use-case in full
A financial-technology (“fintech”) company in the EU processes payments for online shoppers. When a customer disputes a charge — “I never received this order,” “I was double-billed,” “this looks fraudulent” — a human analyst currently investigates and, if the complaint is valid, issues a refund. It's slow and expensive, and the volume is growing. The company wants an AI to handle the whole process by itself.
Here is exactly what the proposed system does:
- It reads the incoming dispute (an email or web form from the customer).
- It investigates on its own — querying the company's transaction and account systems to gather evidence.
- It decides whether to approve or reject the refund.
- For refunds up to €500, it executes the refund itself — it calls the payment system's software interface (its “API”) and moves the money, with no human review.
- Only above €500, or on unusual patterns, does it escalate to a human analyst.
The defining trait: this system does not advise — it acts, and it moves real money. It handles customers' personal and financial data, serves EU customers, and the company wants it live in six months.
Part 2The questions to think through — and why each one matters
- Does it make a consequential decision about a person, on its own?Yes. It approves or denies refunds and, below €500, carries them out with no human involved.
Why it matters: An automated decision that affects someone's money is exactly what the strictest rules exist for. This answer alone signals we are likely in “high-risk” territory — the opposite of Case ①. - Does it act on the real world, or only advise?It acts. It calls live payment systems to move money.
Why it matters: This is the heart of “agentic,” and it changes everything. An AI that only writes text can, at worst, be wrong. An AI that can move money can, at worst, cause immediate, irreversible financial loss — including if someone tricks it. Every other risk in this case is amplified by this one fact. - Does it profile people — analyze their behaviour to judge them?Yes — it weighs a customer's payment history and dispute patterns.
Why it matters: Profiling is treated with special caution in EU law, and it automatically removes the “this is just a simple helper task” exemption that saved Case ①. Once you profile, the easy exits close. - Where, exactly, is the human oversight?Only above €500. Below that threshold there is none at all.
Why it matters: This is the central defect the entire assessment will circle back to. High-risk AI law requires that a human can always understand, override, and stop the system. A design that deliberately removes the human for a whole class of decisions is, by construction, breaking that rule. - What is the blast radius if the system is manipulated or malfunctions?Because it can move money, a single successful manipulation could drain funds or wrongly deny thousands of legitimate customers.
Why it matters: You must size the worst case before you build. Here the worst case is direct financial and legal catastrophe — which justifies heavy, expensive safeguards that would be overkill for a drafting tool. - Which other laws govern automated money decisions?Data-protection law's rule on automated decisions (GDPR Art. 22), and payment-services law (PSD2/PSD3) covering refund rights, deadlines, and the right to a clear reason for a refusal.Why it matters: Just like Case ①, the AI Act is not the only law in the room — but here the extra laws have real teeth about refusing people's money. The AI could satisfy the AI Act and still break payment law by wrongly denying a valid refund.
- Can the system explain its decisions to a customer and a regulator?Not as designed — there's no logging or explanation capability yet.
Why it matters: When you deny someone money, they have a right to know why, and you must be able to reconstruct what happened. “The AI decided” is not an acceptable answer to a regulator. Without records, you cannot defend a single decision.
Part 3How to approach it — same method, far higher stakes
The eight-step method is identical to Case ① — understand, question, classify, map the law, set policies and controls, find and score risks, check the proof, review and plan. What changes is the weight of every step, because the answer to “what can it actually do?” is now “decide and move money by itself.” When a system acts autonomously on something valuable, the assessor's default flips from “how do we enable this?” to “what must be true before we dare let it act unsupervised?”
Part 4Which frameworks apply — and why this one is “High risk”
We walk the same classification path — but this time it lands in the strict tier. The EU AI Act names certain uses as automatically high-risk (its Annex III list). This system hits two of them at once.
Being high-risk triggers the AI Act's full obligation set — the “complete package.” In plain terms:
Part 5What policies to create
Because this system can act, its policies are heavier and one of them is the crux of the whole project.
Part 6How those policies become controls
| Policy (the rule) | Controls that enforce it (the mechanism) — in plain terms |
|---|---|
| Human-Oversight Policy | A live monitoring dashboard showing every decision with a one-click override; mandatory human approval above a much lower threshold (say €100); and hardened escalation logic so edge cases (a €501 read as €499) can't slip through unsupervised. |
| Tool-Use Security Policy | Read-only access by default (the AI can look, not touch); separate, guarded interfaces for actually moving money; hard limits enforced by the payment system itself (max per transaction, per hour, per day); a kill switch to halt everything instantly; and an independent security test that tries to trick the agent before customers can. |
| Model-Risk & Conformity Policy | A living risk register; the technical dossier; the formal conformity check and EU registration; and the fundamental-rights assessment — all completed before launch, not after. |
| Data Governance & Bias Policy | Tracking where data comes from and keeping only what's needed; bias testing to check the AI isn't denying certain groups more often. |
| Logging & Incident Policy | An unchangeable record of every decision, system action, and override; a way to explain a decision to a customer; and a fast reporting process for serious incidents. |
Part 7What the risks are
Ten risks, and the top ones flow directly from the fact that the system acts on money by itself:
| What could go wrong | Score | Level |
|---|---|---|
| The AI moves money with no human able to check it — breaking high-risk AI law by design | 25 | Critical |
| It can't legally launch at all — the required pre-launch checks and registration don't exist | 25 | Critical |
| Someone tricks the AI (prompt injection) into moving money it shouldn't | 20 | Critical |
| No assessment of the harm to people's rights before launch (FRIA) | 20 | High |
| The AI systematically denies certain groups more often (never tested for bias) | 16 | High |
| No records, so decisions can't be explained or defended | 16 | High |
| Poor data governance leads to wrong or unlawful processing of financial data | 16 | High |
| The escalation rule fails and a big or unusual case is handled unsupervised | 15 | High |
| The AI wrongly denies a refund the customer is legally owed (breaking payment law) | 15 | High |
| Nobody is monitoring after launch, so problems go undetected and unreported | 14 | High |
Part 8How to do the risk assessment
Same Likelihood × Impact scoring — but watch how “the harm is designed in” drives likelihood to the maximum:
Prompt injection, scored 20. Likelihood = 3 (this kind of attack is well known and only partly preventable, especially for complex agents), Impact = 5 (it moves real money — immediate loss, plus data-protection and card-security exposure). An AI with permission to move money is, in security terms, a very attractive target.
Part 9Compliance — proving it
The same requirement → control → evidence discipline, for the heavy high-risk obligations:
| The requirement | The control that meets it | The evidence (the receipt) |
|---|---|---|
| Genuine human oversight (AI Act Art. 14) | The monitoring dashboard + documented oversight procedure | Override logs; the written “instructions for use” |
| Formal pre-launch check (Art. 43) | The conformity assessment | A signed Declaration of Conformity + the technical dossier |
| Public registration (Art. 71) | Register in the EU database | The registration record |
| Rights assessment (Art. 27) | The fundamental-rights impact assessment | The signed FRIA document |
| Security & robustness (Art. 15) | The system-boundary controls + security test | The penetration-test report |
Part 10Review — finding the gaps
Part 11The action plan
Side-by-side — why one is Limited and the other High
Two systems, one method, opposite verdicts. Reading the differences across is the fastest way to internalize what actually drives an AI's risk level:
| Dimension | ① RAG support assistant | ② Agentic refund system |
|---|---|---|
| AI-Act tier | Limited | High-risk |
| Why | Only drafts; a human decides. The “simple helper” exemption applies. | Decides and acts by itself, and profiles people. Hits two high-risk categories. |
| What it can actually do | Suggest text | Move real money |
| Biggest risk (score) | Customer data exposed to the outside vendor — 25 | It acts on money with no human check / can't legally deploy — 25 |
| Where the real danger sits | Data protection & accuracy | Autonomy, security of the AI's access, and people's rights |
| The one fix that matters most | A data contract + a real (not rubber-stamp) human review | Re-architect so a human is always able to stop it; secure its access |
| Laws beyond the AI Act | Data protection; insurance conduct rules | Automated-decision rights; payment-services law; card security |
| How heavy is the governance? | Proportionate — light to moderate | The full high-risk regime, plus formal pre-launch checks |
First: a system that only advises a human is worlds apart from one that decides and acts. The word “agentic” means it acts — and acting on something valuable, like money, raises every risk at once. When you assess any AI, the first thing to pin down is not what it's called, but what it can do unsupervised.
Second: the AI-Act risk tier scopes the legal machinery, but it is never the whole job. Our “Limited-risk” RAG assistant still carried four Critical risks — they simply came from data-protection law and accuracy, not from the AI Act. Classifying a system tells you which heavy processes you can skip; it never tells you that you're done. The method is always the same; only the weight of the answer changes.
Practice It Yourself
Five exercises to make the method stick
- Practice each step of the assessment method on fresh, bite-sized examples.
- Build the reflexes: classify a system, ask the right questions, turn a policy into controls, score a risk, and sequence a fix.
- Check yourself against a worked answer after every exercise.
Reading about a method is not the same as being able to do it. These are pen-and-paper exercises — you need nothing but this page and a few minutes of thinking. Each one isolates a single skill from the two case studies, gives you a task, and then lets you check your reasoning against a worked answer. Try each one before you open the answer; the struggle is where the learning happens.
Lab AClassify it yourself
For each system below, walk the tier decision from Module 13: is it banned? one of the high-risk uses (credit, hiring, insurance pricing/claims, essential services, biometrics)? a limited-risk case (it talks to people or generates content)? or minimal? Assign a tier and, more importantly, say why.
- An AI that filters spam out of employees' email inboxes.
- A chatbot on a shopping website that answers product questions and tells users it's an AI.
- An AI that screens job applications for an EU employer and auto-rejects anyone below a score.
- An AI that recommends films to stream based on what you've watched.
- An AI that drafts reply suggestions for bank support agents, who edit and send them.
Answer key — try it first
- Minimal. Spam filtering doesn't decide anything about a person's rights or access. No obligations.
- Limited. It interacts with the public, so it owes transparency — which it already provides by disclosing it's an AI. Nothing heavier.
- High-risk. Recruitment is on the high-risk list, and it makes a real decision (auto-reject) about a person. Full regime applies.
- Minimal. A recommendation with no effect on rights or access. No obligations.
- Limited. This is our Case ① in miniature: it only suggests to a human who decides. The heavy weight here isn't the AI Act — it's data protection, because customer data is involved.
The pattern: the tier is driven by what decision the AI makes about a person, not by how clever or “AI” it feels. #1 and #4 touch no one's rights; #3 decides someone's future; #2 and #5 only talk or suggest.
Lab BAsk the right questions
Scenario: A hospital wants an AI that reads a patient's history and suggests to the doctor which of three treatment options to consider. The doctor makes every final decision.
Write down five questions you would ask before assessing this system — and for each, one sentence on why it matters.
Answer key — try it first
- Does it decide, or only suggest? — Determines the risk tier; here it suggests, but…
- Is the domain safety-critical? — Healthcare is; even an “assist” tool influencing treatment can be high-risk because the stakes are life-and-health. (This is the trap: “it only suggests” did not save Case ①'s cousin here.)
- What data does it use, and how sensitive is it? — Health data is the most protected category under GDPR; special rules apply.
- Will the doctor genuinely weigh it, or defer to it? — Automation bias is dangerous when a tired clinician trusts the machine.
- What happens if the suggestion is wrong, and can we trace why it was made? — You must be able to explain and defend a suggestion that contributed to harm.
Lesson: good questions expose the edges. The most important insight here is that “it only suggests” is not an automatic free pass — the domain and the consequence can still push a suggestion-only tool into high-risk.
Lab CTurn a policy into controls
A company writes this policy: “No customer personal data may be sent to an external AI provider without protecting it.” That's the rule. Now list the controls — the concrete mechanisms — that would actually make it true.
Answer key — try it first
- A signed data contract with the provider (bans training on your data, sets storage location, requires breach notice).
- A pseudonymization step that strips names and IDs before any data leaves your systems.
- A consent checkpoint that blocks data for customers who haven't agreed.
- A vendor security check before onboarding, and ongoing monitoring afterwards.
- Logging of what was sent, so you can prove the rule was followed.
Lesson: a policy is a promise; each control is a mechanism that keeps it. Notice one policy usually needs several controls — and if you can't name a control for a policy, that policy isn't real yet.
Lab DScore the risks
For the hiring-screening AI from Lab A (#3), score these three risks using Likelihood × Impact (1–5 each). Justify each number, then place it in a band (Low 1–5, Medium 6–11, High 12–19, Critical 20–25).
- The AI systematically rejects more women than men because of biased training data.
- A hacker steals the candidate database.
- A typo in the rejection email template.
Answer key — try it first
- Biased rejections — Likelihood 4, Impact 5 → 20, Critical. LLM/ML bias is well documented (high likelihood), and discriminating in hiring is both illegal and deeply harmful (max impact).
- Database breach — Likelihood 3, Impact 4 → 12, High. Breaches are a real, ongoing threat; the impact is serious (privacy fines, harm) but bounded relative to systemic discrimination.
- Email typo — Likelihood 3, Impact 1 → 3, Low. Common but trivial; embarrassing, not harmful.
Lesson: scoring separates the scary-sounding from the genuinely dangerous. All three “could happen,” but only one threatens the business and its candidates. The number is what gets the bias risk the budget it deserves.
Lab EFind the gaps and sequence the fix
Scenario: A company is two months from launching the hiring-screening AI. Today it has: a job-applicant privacy notice ✅, encrypted storage ✅. It does not have: any bias testing, a human review of rejections, a record of why each candidate was rejected, or an approved AI policy.
Turn the missing items into a plan: which are must-have before launch, which are should-have soon after, and why in that order?
Answer key — try it first
Must-have before launch:
- Bias testing — launching a discriminatory hiring tool is illegal and harmful; this is the core risk.
- Human review of rejections — a high-risk decision about a person needs a person able to intervene; auto-reject with no human is the exact defect from Case ②.
- A record of why each candidate was rejected — you must be able to explain and defend every decision.
Should-have soon after:
- Approve the AI policy — important for durable governance, but the three items above directly prevent immediate harm, so they come first. (In practice, ratifying the policy is what authorizes the rest — so start it in parallel even if it finishes slightly later.)
Lesson: sequence by what prevents harm at launch. A gap that makes the launch illegal or unsafe outranks a gap that merely makes the program tidier — even when the tidy one is technically foundational.
CapstoneRun the whole method
Put it all together on a fresh system: “An AI for an EU lender that automatically approves or declines small top-up loans up to €2,000 for existing customers, and issues the approved funds itself. Larger requests go to a human.”
Walk all eight steps: understand → question → classify → map the law → policies & controls → risks → compliance → gaps & plan. Write a short assessment, then compare.
Model answer — try it first
- Classify → High-risk. Creditworthiness/lending is explicitly on the high-risk list, and the AI decides and acts (issues funds) autonomously — just like Case ②.
- Map the law: the full AI-Act high-risk regime; GDPR's automated-decision rights (a declined loan is a significant automated decision); consumer-credit rules; plus the security concerns of an AI that moves money.
- Policies & controls: activate AI governance; a human-oversight policy (a person must be able to review/override, especially for declines); secure the funding action at the system boundary; risk management, rights assessment, conformity check and registration before launch.
- Top risks: autonomous funding without oversight (Critical); can't legally launch without the pre-checks (Critical); biased approvals/declines (High); no explanation for a decline (High).
- Gaps & plan: must-have — add human oversight, do the conformity check + registration, run bias testing, build decision logging; should-have — monitoring, incident reporting, customer explanations.
If you got “high-risk, needs human oversight, needs pre-launch checks” — you've internalized the method. The specifics will always need a specialist, but you now know exactly what to look for and what to demand before anyone says “ship it.”
Hand any AI system through these eight steps and you'll produce a defensible first assessment: what tier it's in, which laws apply, what rules and mechanisms it needs, what could go wrong, and what to fix first. That's the whole discipline — and it's a skill, not a secret.
Reference & Glossary
Keep this open while you work
The 10 frameworks in the dossier
| Framework | Abbr. | Jurisdiction | Domain |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Data Protection Regulation | GDPR | EU | Privacy |
| Sarbanes-Oxley Act | SOX | US | Financial reporting |
| Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act | HIPAA | US | Health data |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | ISO 27001 | International | Infosec management |
| Payment Card Industry DSS | PCI DSS | International | Card data |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework | NIST CSF | US | Cybersecurity |
| California Consumer Privacy Act | CCPA | California | Privacy |
| EU Artificial Intelligence Act | AI Act | EU | AI — horizontal |
| AI Compliance Management | AICM | International | AI — lifecycle |
| AI Ethics in the EU | AIEU | EU | AI — trustworthiness |
Glossary
The 360 in one sentence per face
- Governance — ratify the policy so someone can say no.
- Risk — score it so the danger is legible.
- Compliance — map obligation to control to evidence.
- Controls — prevent, detect, correct; then test.
- Lifecycle — gate it from intake to retirement.
- Assurance — prove it independently, on a dated backlog.
The AI Governance Dossier · GRC for Generative AI. A practitioner course grounded in a full, realistic GRC dataset (10 frameworks · 12 policies · 35 controls · 22 risks · 28 mitigations · 18 audit findings · 48 compliance mappings).
*Aurelia Group is a fictional organization and all figures are synthetic teaching material. Article references reflect Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and related EU law. This course is educational and is not legal advice.